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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to raise the following question. What should be
the optimal labor in
ow into a sector which exclusively uses foreign capital?
Suppose a small open economy, hitherto endowed with local capital and labor,
ushers in foreign capital to create a new product to be produced in the newly
developed sector, will free mobility of labor then lead to the socially optimal
outcome? Under the standard presumption of `full-repatriation' of foreign
capital income, the answer to the above question is a clear `no.' We shall
attempt to develop this idea in more detail and analyze the resultant policy
implications.
It has been recognized in trade theory that foreign capital in
ow may
directly (Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977), Brecher and Findlay (1983),
Neary and Ruane (1988) and others) or indirectly (Beladi and Marjit (1992))
increase the extent of existing trade distortions and thus lead to a decline in
national welfare in a standard competitive, neo-classical trade model.
More recently, Marjit and Beladi (1996) and Marjit, Broll and Mitra
(1997) have argued how the in
ow of foreign capital in a tari-distorted in-
termediate sector can lead to a welfare gain even with the standard assump-
tion of full repatriation of foreign capital income. Marjit and Beladi (1996)
exploit the conventional structure and highlight the role of the intermediate
good in this context. Some of the recent notable contributions in this area
are by Chao and Yu (1996), (1997).
The issue of extra labor participation in foreign capital controlled sectors
of a developing economy has not recieved much interest from trade theorists
although such issues have been quite important in practice. Restrictions of
labor in
ow into the export processing zones of China, wage and employment
implications of foreign investment in East and South East Asia etc., have been
thoroughly discussed in the work of Warr (1990). One possible policy question
that we raise in this context is whether the local government should pursue
a policy whereby the local capitalists and foreign capital owners should face
dierent wage rates for labor. Apparently, such a distortionary intervention
may have welfare reducing implications. However, the answer to this question
may depend on several factors, although we cannot rule out the optimality
of such a dierential.
Jones and Marjit (1995) have argued that when the workers working in
the newly developed sector gradually reveal their skills, there is a case for
a minimum wage in the foreign enclave. Without such a wage there is a
terms-of-trade loss which is generated by the free labor 
ow into the foreignDomestic labor and foreign capital 3
controlled sector. For an earlier analysis of enclave models one may refer to
Jones and Dei (1983).
In this paper we take up a very conventional specic-factors model (Jones
(1971)) where labor moves between two sectors which use local and foreign
capital, respectively. In addition to the standard assumptions of competi-
tive markets and neo-classical technology, i.e., constant returns to scale and
diminishing marginal productivity, we explore the implications of an imper-
fect market for foreign capital, the possibility of reinvestment of the capital
returns from it in sector-specic investments and its partial repatriation. A
market outcome of wage equality across sectors could then be socially op-
timal only in a borderline case, i.e. when the rate of reinvestment equals a
critical value.
One must recognise that when the foreign capital income is repatriated,
labor in
ow generate a negative externality for national welfare. The in
ow
of labor into the foreign sector may raise the return to foreign capital, thus
worsening the sectoral terms-of-trade for the small economy. Any policy that
tends to restore the terms-of-trade loss must also take into account the possi-
ble adverse impact of such policies on the in
ow of capital. To the extent that
the foreign capital income is reinvested in the country, `taxing' foreign capital
in one way or the other may prove to be harmful for the local economy. The
socially optimal employment allocation between the local and the foreign
owned sectors may dier from the standard competitive outcome when all
the above mentioned factors are taken into account.
In order to have a benchmark for our main ndings, we present in section 2
a simple model of capital income, repatriation and national welfare. In section
3 we provide a detailed analysis of the eects of a competitive allocation of
labor across dierent sectors of an economy where one of the sectors uses
foreign capital. We argue that suitably designed government intervention is
required to restrict the sectors to their optimal size and maximize national
welfare. In this context we demonstrate the optimality of a minimum wage
regulation. section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Two sectors in a small economy produce good X and Y . Sector X uses local
capital K and local labor LX; sector Y uses foreign capital K and local
labor LY . Markets are competitive and standard neo-classical technology in
each sector is assumed. However, it is assumed that the two types of capital4
used in production are sector-specic. This is modeled by an imperfect world
capital market.
An imperfect world capital market suggests that K, the stock of foreign
capital, is positively related to the dierence of rental rates, r   rw, where
r denotes the domestic real return to foreign capital and rw denes the
exogenous return in the rest of the world, i.e. K = K(r   rw). Since r
itself depends on K, as it is natural in the standard specic-factors model,
a decline in r due to some other factor leads to an out
ow of K, raising
r to some extent. The assumption of an imperfect capital market allows
foreign capital supply to be aected by such changes. With the stock of local
capital K being independent of the interest rate r, shifts in the marginal
product of foreign capital K will never aect the availability of the former.
We assume that a part rK(r   rw) of the foreign capital income is
added to the existing capital stock as reinvestment and that the remainder
of [1 ]rK(r  rw) is repatriated to the foreign country. Hence  2 [0;1]
denotes the rate of investment which is decided on by the foreign capitalists.
For simplicity we ignore investment in local capital.
Note that a competitive equilibrium with no intervention implies an allo-
cation of labor across sectors such that the wage rates are equalized. We have
a standard specic-factors model like Jones (1971) with the usual pattern of
determination of equilibrium values.
Assuming the existence of a social welfare function which is maximized
with costless income redistribution, our country's welfare level can be repre-
sented by a real GNP function 
. The social planner maximizes real national
income after accounting for repatriable income and investment. The real na-
tional income 
 is expressed as

 = PX(LX;K) + Y (LY ;K
[1 + r
])   [1   ]r
K
: (1)
We assume that the relative commodity price P =
PX
PY is constant, i.e.
we abstract from a terms-of-trade eect; furthermore we take rw to be a
constant and suppress it as an argument.
The problem of the planner is to maximize 
 with respect to LY (or LX)Domestic labor and foreign capital 5






















Proposition 1. Given a small open economy with foreign specic capital,
repatriation of foreign capital income, and mobile domestic workers as de-
scribed above, a competitive equilibrium will not necessarily maximize the
host country's national welfare.








if and only if   1
(1+r)
1
(1+), where   @K=@r  r=K.
3 Labor mobility and national welfare
In this section, we will lay down a couple of observations which can be made
from (2) and (3).
3.1 National welfare
First, suppose  = 0, i.e., we have a given stock of foreign capital K. If
r goes up by a unit, investment augments the capital stock by K. The
contribution of this increment to real output is @Y=@KK(= rK). How-
ever, [1   ]K is repatriated. Hence, the net contribution to the small open
economy's welfare is measured by [ [1 + r]   1]K.
The net contribution will be positive if  > 1=(1+r), condition (3). The
fraction of foreign capital return added to the foreign capital stock is high
enough to make the local economy better o.
On the other hand, if  < 1=[1+r], the critical value of  is fallen short
of. There may be the case for immiserizing growth, i.e. the local economy
gets worse o from attracting foreign capital instead of benetting from it.6
The planner will therefore like to prevent a rise in r by restricting labor
in
ow into sector Y .
When  = 1=[1+r], the local economy's competitive equilibrium will be
socially optimal. The rate of reinvestment is sucient not to harm the local
economy. Wages are equalized across the two sectors.
Now consider the case that  > 0. A rise in r now has the additional
benet of raising the foreign capital stock further by @K=@r [1+r], and
at the same time leads to further leakage of [1   ]r@K=@r. Using the
denition of  and following (2), we can prove that for P@X=@LX = @Y=@LY
to hold  must satisfy  = [[1 + r][1 + ]] 1.
We can summarize the above ndings as follows:
Proposition 2. If the rate of investment  is low, it is optimal to re-
strict labor mobility in Y . If  is fairly high, it is optimal to reduce
employment in X.
With a low investment ratio , the restriction of labor in
ow into sector
Y will be justied since the workers will not internalize the resultant loss
to the national economy. On the other hand, with a high investment ratio
it is optimal to reduce employment in X relative to the competitive market
solution.
3.2 Policy implication
The implementation of such a policy scheme of restricted labor in
ow will
require explicit sector-specic employment subsidies. Another way to achieve
a similar outcome is to impose a minimum wage in one of the sectors and let
the wage adjust in the other sector. Consider the case where  = 0 and  = 0,
i.e., the stock of capital is xed and the entire capital income is repatriated.
Let W be the wage rate. Condition (2) tells us that




 = WY : (4)
Since @r=@LY > 0, the optimal national wide employment is determined
where MPLY  @r=LY K intersects with the MPLX curve, as demonstrated
in gure 1. Segment 0YLY is the national welfare maximizing employment for
the foreign sector. Note that one can implement this by setting a minimum
wage W Y in sector Y and letting the residual supply 0XLX be cleared at the
wage WX. Full repatriation of foreign capital income prevents the marginalDomestic labor and foreign capital 7
product of labor in X and Y from equalizing as they would in the standard
specic factor model. Here, in contrast, domestic labor is not the winner of
the general increase in the foreign capital stock. The national welfare loss

















Figure 1: Wages with full repatriation
It is straightforward to argue that the investment propensity of the local
capitalists should also feature in our analysis. The way we have set up the
problem makes the local sector a passive element. Our purpose has been to
highlight a particular case. One can also work out the general condition by
endogenising the behavior of the local capital owners.
4 Concluding remarks
The unrestricted movement of labor across all sectors of an economy whereby
marginal productivity of labor is equalized is usually a desirable eciency8
requirement. Greater in
ow of labor in a sector that uses foreign capital
may not be desirable from the point of view of national welfare. Competitive
allocation fails to internalize the impact of labor in
ow on the supply of
foreign capital, repatriation of capital income and reinvestment possibilities.
We have shown the existence of optimal policy intervention in this context
which calls for targeting allocation of employment in each sector.
We have left out the issue of investment of local capital and also the
endogenous determination of the share of income repatriation. These could be
explored in a dynamic model. However, as long as there are certain leakages or
in
ows associated with the size of a particular sector, competitive allocations
will not be socially optimal and will call for government action. However,
given the structure of the model, one can compute appropriate shadow prices
for policy evalutaiton purposes.Domestic labor and foreign capital 9
Appendix
We derive the solution to the maximization problem of equation (1) ignoring
a terms of trade eect. The economy's real GNP is given by:

 = PX( L   LY ;K) + Y (LY ;K
[1 + r
])   [1   ]r
K
:
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if and only if
 r
@K
@r [1 + r
] + K
 [ [1 + r
]   1]  0:
Rearranging terms and dividing by K we get the investment ratio
 
1
[1 + r][1 + ]
;
where  = @K
@r
r
K is the elasticity of foreign capital supply.10
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